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A Tale of Two Carbon Sinks: Can Forest Carbon
Management Serve as a Framework to Implement Ocean
Iron Fertilization as a Climate Change Treaty
Compliance Mechanism?
Randall S. Abatet
Any post-Kyoto climate change treaty regime must seek to fully en-
gage the use of carbon sinks to complement emissions reduction
measures in order to comply with the treaty's mandates. The Kyoto
Protocol did not include avoided deforestation as a mechanism for
earning emission reduction credits. However, reducing emissions
from deforestation and degradation (REDD) quickly gained popu-
larity as a viable climate change compliance strategy in the period
immediately preceding the negotiations at the Fifteenth Conference
of the Parties (COP 15) in Copenhagen in 2009. The Copenhagen
Accord is replete with references to REDD as a focus for the inter-
national community's progression toward a binding successor
agreement to the Kyoto Protocol.
Ocean iron fertilization (OlF) is an emerging and controversial
strategy to promote climate change treaty compliance, and may be
the next step in engaging the creative use of carbon sinks to fulfill
carbon reduction mandates. Both REDD and OIF must overcome
challenges such as developing effective monitoring techniques, en-
suring the "permanence" of emission reductions, and avoiding
"leakage" of such reductions. Like REDD, OIF could promote a
global carbon trading market that may help ensure the success of a
post-Kyoto climate change treaty. Unlike REDD, however, OIF is
hampered by "moral hazard" and "unintended consequences" con-
cerns associated with its techniques. In addition, to ensure effective
regulation of the research and implementation of OIF projects, OIF
must overcome significant international law governance challenges.
tAssociate Professor of Law, Florida A&M University College of Law. The author presented an
earlier version of this paper on a panel at the 2nd Yale-UNITAR Conference on Environmental
Governance and Democracy at Yale Law School on September 18, 2010. The author gratefully
acknowledges the assistance of Carla Nadal, Nick Claridge, Ani Garibyan, Elliott Jung, Betty Kuo,
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Nevertheless, OIF has the potential to build on REDD's success and
become incorporated as another important dimension of a post-
Kyoto carbon market system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Climate change is the most daunting and divisive environmental
governance issue that humanity has ever faced. Traditional treaty negoti-
ation and implementation efforts remain relevant to combat this crisis;
however, these channels of governance and diplomacy have fallen short
of expectations in significant respects in the past two decades. For exam-
ple, the refusal of the United States to become a member of the Kyoto
Protocol1 has severely undermined the effectiveness of this global green-
house gas emissions reduction agreement. In addition, the Copenhagen
Accord 2 does not commit nations to binding emission reduction goals
and is a merely aspirational, non-binding international law agreement.
Therefore, the much-anticipated Fifteenth Conference of the Parties to
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP
15), held in Copenhagen in 2009, was widely regarded as a failure.3
Relying exclusively on traditional domestic emission reduction
strategies will not suffice to meet the ambitious and urgent goals of cli-
mate change treaty compliance in the post-Kyoto era. The parties to the
Kyoto Protocol recognized the need for flexible compliance strategies
and implemented one such mechanism to fulfill this objective in the form
of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).4 This creative com-
pliance mechanism provides an opportunity for partnerships between
developed and developing countries to promote clean energy projects
that enable the participating countries to earn credits for emission reduc-
tions.5
The international community now has a valuable opportunity to ex-
pand the scope of the CDM model and employ market-based mechan-
1. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened
for signature Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 (entered intoforce Feb. 16, 2005) [hereinafter Kyo-
to Protocol].
2. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties, Copenhagen,
Den., Dec. 7-19, 2009, Copenhagen Accord, art. 6, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 (Dec. 18, 2009),
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/copl5/eng/1la01.pdf#page=4.pdf [hereinafter
Copenhagen Accord].
3. Given the recent failures in international climate change negotiations, some commentators
have questioned whether the U.N. Conference of the Parties model is the best approach to address
the international climate change crisis. See, e.g., John M. Broder, The Last U.N. Climate Extrava-
ganza?, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 8, 2010, http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/08/the-last-u-n-climate-
extravaganza/.
4. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, art. 12.
5. See id.
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isms, consequently providing more flexibility in responding to the cli-
mate change crisis. Carbon markets have developed rapidly since the
Kyoto Protocol's emissions reduction commitments entered into force in
2005. Mandatory and voluntary carbon markets have been established.6
The mandatory carbon markets, such as the EU Emissions Trading Sys-
tem, have not drawn on avoided deforestation credits.7 However, within
the past few years, voluntary carbon markets based on reducing emis-
sions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) have emerged and are
working effectively.8 These developments offer some hope that an inter-
national carbon market, bolstered by the authorized use of avoided de-
forestation credits, could evolve as part of a post-Kyoto climate change
compliance regime.
If and when REDD becomes more institutionalized, ocean iron fer-
tilization (OIF) projects may then be able to capitalize on REDD's suc-
cesses and become the next step forward in the use of market-based cli-
mate change regulation mechanisms. Tradable credits generated from the
carbon dioxide sequestered from OIF projects could be part of a climate
change compliance regime in much the same manner as avoided defore-
station credits in REDD. However, several social, scientific, and legal
uncertainties impede OIF' s succession of REDD.
II. REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND DEGRADATION
(REDD)
The Kyoto Protocol's exclusion of two significant contributing
sources to climate change-deforestation and forest degradation-from
its regulatory framework is one reason it failed to produce an adequate
international response to climate change. 9 Reducing emissions of green-
house gases from traditional industrial sources, while failing to address
emissions from other significant sources, created a situation of winning
the battle but losing the war against climate change. Deforestation and
forest degradation release up to eighteen percent of annual global carbon
6. CLtMENT CHENOST et al., Bringing Forest Carbon Projects to the Market, UNEP 24, (2010),
available at http://www.unep.fr/energy/activities/forest carbon/pdf/Guidebook%20English%20
Final%2019-5-2010%20high%20res.pdf.
7. Id. at 32.
8. Id. at 35.
9. During the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, REDD was considered and ultimately rejected for
inclusion as one of the flexibility mechanisms in the Protocol. See Crystal Davis, Protecting Forests
to Save the Climate: REDD Challenges and Opportunities, World Resources Institute, Apr. 23,
2010, http://earthtrends.wri.org/updates/node/303; See also Randall S. Abate & Todd A. Wright, A
Green Solution to Climate Change: The Hybrid Approach to Crediting Reductions in Tropical De-
forestation, 20 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 87, 100 (2010) (more than a decade after the exclusion
of REDD from Kyoto, "developing countries remain ineligible to earn tradable carbon credits under
the Kyoto Protocol for curbing deforestation.").
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dioxide emissions.10 Forestry projects under the CDM do not include
avoided deforestation but rather are limited to afforestation and reforesta-
tion.1 Moreover, CDM forestry projects comprise only 0.4% of all regis-
tered CDM projects. 12 The CDM also has failed to provide developing
countries with a meaningful role in addressing global climate change
because it is too narrow and administratively stringent to achieve broad-
based participation.13
REDD offers an opportunity to build on the CDM's basic premise
of cultivating partnerships between developed and developing nations in
meeting climate change commitments, while operating in a more flexible
and inclusive manner. REDD represents a critically important partner-
ship between developed and developing countries. It involves developed
countries paying developing countries to protect their tropical forests as
an international climate change mitigation strategy. 14 REDD seeks to
establish a financial value for the carbon stored in forests by offering
incentives for developing countries to reduce emissions from forested
lands.1
5
Even though the international community was well aware of the
important role that REDD could play in climate change treaty com-
pliance, the parties to the Kyoto Protocol rejected the inclusion of this
mechanism within the regime's regulatory framework, citing concerns
relating to monitoring and verification of reductions from REDD
projects. 16 Conceptually, environmental groups opposed REDD on the
10. SIR NICHOLAS STERN, THE STERN REVIEW ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 171
(2006), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/stern review report.htm.
11. See Bernard Schlamadinger et al., Should We Include Avoidance of Deforestation in the
International Response to Climate Change?, in TROPICAL DEFORESTATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE
53, 53 (Paulo Moutinho & Stephan Schwartzman eds., 2005). "Afforestation and deforestation both
refer to anthropogenic conversion of non-forested areas into forested land. The difference is that
afforestation refers to projects on land that has not been forested for at least fifty years, while refore-
station refers to the conversion of non-forested areas that have not been forested since December 31,
1989." Abate & Wright, supra note 9, at 94 (internal citations omitted). REDD's system of generat-
ing credits for avoided deforestation provides a more effective response to limiting anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation as compared to the CDM's
limited framework.
12. CHENOST, supra note 6, at 8.
13. Abate & Wright, supra note 9, at 95-97; see generally Ann E. Prouty, The Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism and its Implications for Climate Justice, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 513 (2009); Mi-
chael Wara, Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism's Performance and Potential, 55 UCLA
L. REv. 1759 (2008) (discussion of the CDM and some of the criticisms that have been lodged
against it).
14. See UN-REDD Programme: The United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (2009),
http://www.un-redd.org/AboutREDD/tabid/582/language/en-US/Default.aspx
15. Id.
16. Abate & Wright, supra note 9, at 98.
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basis that industrialized nations should not be permitted to circumvent
their greenhouse gas emission reduction requirements by investing in
REDD projects.1 7 Another major concern is that funds generated from
REDD activities could work to the detriment of indigenous forest com-
munities by falling into the hands of corrupt local government officials.18
Several years after being considered and rejected as a Kyoto com-
pliance mechanism, REDD's role as a potentially valuable tool in the
fight against climate change gained popularity at the Eleventh Confe-
rence of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (COP 11) in Montreal in 2005.19 "Spearheaded by the
Coalition of Rainforest Nations, a group of developing nations with a
high percentage of tropical rainforests that support the use of carbon cre-
dits to curb tropical deforestation, REDD was proposed as a way to en-
hance developing nations' contribution to climate change compliance.,
20
REDD also was expressly included as part of the Bali Action Plan at
COP 13 in Bali in December 2007,21 which called for "policy approaches
and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from de-
forestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of
conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of
forest carbon stocks in developing countries. 22 From 2005 to the
present, REDD has become a focus of the developing world's negotia-
23tion strategy for a post-Kyoto regime.
Prior to the linking of forest conservation and climate change com-
pliance through REDD projects, global forest conservation efforts had
been limited to non-binding international environmental agreements such
as the forest conservation principles developed at the United Nations
17. Erin Myers Madeira, Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) in
Developing Countries: An Examination of the Issues Facing the Incorporation of REDD into Mar-
ket-Based Climate Change Policies 29 (2008), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-
Rpt-REDD final.2.20.09.pdf.
18. Id.
19. Rhett Butler, Forest Conservation in U.S. Climate Policy: An Interview with Jeff Horowitz,
Mongabay.com, Feb. 5, 2010, available at http://print.news.mongabay.com/2010/0205-
adp forests redd.html?print.
20. Randall S. Abate, REDD, White, and Blue: Is Proposed U.S. Climate Legislation Adequate
to Promote a Global Carbon Credits System for Avoided Deforestation in a Post-Kyoto Regime?, 19
Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 95, 99 (2010) (internal citations omitted).
21. See Bali Action Plan, Decision -/C.P. 13, available at http://unfccc.intlfiles/meetings/
cop 13/application/pdf/cp bali action.pdf.
22. Id. at art. 1(b)(iii).
23. For a comprehensive summary of the evolution of REDD from Kyoto to Copenhagen, see
generally CARBON PLANET WHITE PAPER: THE HISTORY OF REDD POLICY (Dec. 4, 2009), available
at http://www.carbonplanet.com/protected downloads/white papers/le History of REDD.pdf.
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Conference on Environment and Development in 1992.24 Consequently,
the win-win scenario that REDD offers to achieve two desirable goals
simultaneously-conserving forests and addressing the climate change
problem-has a compelling appeal if incorporated into a mandatory cli-
mate change regime. However, the international community's confidence
in the reliability of this alternative compliance mechanism has developed
slowly and reluctantly.
The implementation challenges that critics have raised about REDD
led to the creation of "REDD+" as a potentially more effective and flexi-
ble form of REDD for the future. "REDD's evolution into REDD+ at the
Poznan negotiations in December 2008, and the Bonn negotiations in
March 2009, helped propel the hope that REDD would be instrumental at
Copenhagen. ' '25 REDD+ was developed as a way to preserve what was
compelling about REDD as a climate change compliance strategy and
transform it into an approach to promote sustainable development in fo-
restry management practices in developing nations. REDD+ involved a
transition to an enhanced, broad-based approach that includes conserva-
tion, sustainable forest management, and forest carbon stock enhance-
ment. 26 "REDD+ goes further than just rewarding actions that 'do less
harm' (e.g. less forest clearance and unsustainable management). It will
also reward practices that 'do more good' such as those that create new,
and improve existing, carbon sinks., 27 In May 2010, fifty-two nations
gathered in Oslo, Norway for a climate change and forests conference.28
The meeting was regarded as an important step forward to help REDD+
gain momentum in the months leading up to COP 16 in Cancfn, Mexico
in December 2010.29
One of the greatest successes of the Copenhagen Accord is the in-
clusion of references to REDD and REDD+ that appear throughout the
24. See Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on
the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, June 13,
1992, 31 EL.M. 881.
25. Abate, supra note 20, at 100.
26. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the Center for People and Forests, Forests
and Climate Change After Copenhagen: An Asia-Pacific Perspective 6 (2010), available at
http://recoftc.org/site/fileadmin/docs/publications/The Grey Zone/2010/FCC-after-
Copenhagen 3.pdf [hereinafter FAO Report].
27. Id.
28. Climate Change Commission Joins 52 Countries in REDD+ Partnership Alvarez,
BAYANIHAN, May 30, 2010, http://bayanihan.org/2010/05/30/climate-change-commission-joins-52-
countries-in-redd-partnership-alvarez.
29. Id. See also, Oslo Climate Change Conference Report May Feature, COOL EARTH, May
2010, http://www.coolearth.org/371/news-32/features-147/oslo-climate-change-conference-report-
may-feature-1400.html (Robert Zoellick, chief of the World Bank, remarked that the outcome of the
Oslo meeting may "be the first comprehensive component for a future international agreement on
climate change.").
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agreement. 30 For example, Article 6 acknowledges the critical role of
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation to "enable
the mobilization of financial resources from developed countries" to re-
duce global greenhouse gas emissions. 3 Article 8 seeks to implement
this objective by providing that developed countries will contribute 30
million dollars in adaptation funding between 2010-2012 to the "most
vulnerable developing countries, such as the least developed countries,
,32
small island developing states and Africa." Despite these positive steps
forward, the Copenhagen Accord contains little guidance regarding how
to implement the REDD provisions in the agreement.
Not surprisingly, funding is one of the most significant unanswered
questions regarding the implementation of REDD projects. Financing for
REDD activities could be fund-based, market-based, or a combination of
these approaches. REDD activities are likely to be fund-based initially
with market-based support factoring in slowly over time. 33 Market-based
support will likely evolve into mandatory compliance schemes as confi-
34dence in the carbon market system grows.
COP 15 represents the first significant step forward for REDD as a
component of a post-2012 climate change regime because the Copenha-
gen Accord negotiated at the meeting contains important references to
REDD and REDD+. 35 Despite the failure to forge a binding climate
change agreement in Copenhagen, there is a sense of cautious optimism
that the negotiations and outcomes addressing REDD from the Copenha-
gen meeting have established a framework for continued progress on this
issue in future COP meetings.3 6 Nevertheless, while its popularity has
continued to grow in the international community, REDD has been slow
to take hold in carbon markets because of implementation concerns re-
garding monitoring, additionality, permanence, and leakage of REDD
activities.3  OIF also faces these challenges, which will be discussed be-
low.
30. Commentators who considered the negotiations at Copenhagen to be at least partially suc-
cessful referred to the inclusion of REDD as the foundation for that conclusion. See, e.g., Tensie
Whelan, REDD in Copenhagen: Picking the Low-Hanging Fruit vs. Saving the Tree, ENVT'L
LEADER, Dec. 16, 2009, http://www.environmentalleader.com/2009/12/16/redd-in-copenhagen-
picking-the-low-hanging-fruit-vs-saving-the-tree/; and Butler, supra note 19.
31. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 2, art. 6.
32. Id. art. 8.
33. FAO Report, supra note 26, at 7.
34. See id.
35. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 2, arts. 6, 8.
36. FAO Report, supra note 26, at 5. COP 16, which is taking place as of this writing in Can-
cun, Mexico in December 2010, will be an important gauge of the significance of REDD's role in
negotiating a post-Kyoto agreement.
37. Abate & Wright, supra note 9, at 102-05.
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III. OCEAN IRON FERTILIZATION (OIF)
Deforestation and forest degradation are significant components of
the climate change crisis38 and must be regulated regardless of whether
such controls are implemented through REDD or some other mechanism.
Like REDD, ocean iron fertilization (OIF) is a market-based method of
reducing the amount of atmospheric carbon dioxide. OIF differs from
REDD in that while REDD seeks to prevent anthropogenic emissions
from deforestation, OIF involves the capture of carbon through direct or
indirect addition of iron to surface waters. 39 OIF is designed to "enhance
microscopic marine plant growth, on a scale large enough not only to
significantly increase the uptake of atmospheric carbon by the ocean, but
also to remove it from the atmosphere for long enough to provide global
climatic benefit., 40 Notwithstanding the conceptual difference between
REDD and OIF, many of the challenges and opportunities for success
associated with adopting REDD as a climate change compliance me-
chanism also apply to employing OIF techniques.
OIF involves dispersing iron particles into ocean areas where iron
exists in low concentrations such that its absence limits phytoplankton
growth. 41 The addition of iron is designed to "stimulate the rapid growth
of phytoplankton whose photosynthetic activity could potentially absorb
heat trapping carbon. 4 2 The ultimate objective of OIF is to absorb car-
bon dioxide and store it in the ocean interior for an adequate duration and
in a sufficient quantity so as "to make a significant reduction in the in-
crease of atmospheric CO 2 in a verifiable manner, without deleterious
unintended side effects. 43
There are two primary categories of climate geoengineering tech-
niques: solar radiation management and carbon dioxide removal. 44 OIF is
a method of carbon dioxide removal. Implementing geoengineering
projects such as OIF involves the threat of transboundary impacts.45 The
38. See STERN, supra note 10 and accompanying text.
39. U.N. Educ. Scientific & Cultural Org. (UNESCO), Intergovernmental Oceanographic
Commission, Ocean Fertilization: A Scientific Summary for Policy Maker, IOC/2010/1BRO/2 (forth-
coming 2010) (prepared by Doug Wallace et al.) [hereinafter Intergovernmental Oceanographic
Commission].
40. Id.
41. Randall S. Abate & Andrew B. Greenlee, Sowing Seeds Uncertain: Ocean Iron Fertiliza-
tion, Climate Change, and the International Environmental Law Framework, 27 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 555, 561 (2010).
42. Id. at 560-561.
43. Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, supra note 39.
44. Kelsi Bracmort, et al., Cong. Research Serv., R41371, Geoengineering: Governance and
Technology 2 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41371.pdf.
45. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-546T, CLIMATE CHANGE: PRELIMINARY
OBSERVATIONS ON GEOENGINEERING SCIENCE, FEDERAL EFFORTS, AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES:
[Vol. 1: 1
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U.S. Government Accountability Office has recommended that, where
transboundary impacts are involved, transparency and international co-
operation are key factors for pursuing geoengineering research.46
A. Obstacles to OIF Implementation
OIF faces several critical challenges that currently limit its ability to
be implemented as a viable climate change compliance mechanism in a
mandatory or voluntary regulatory scheme. These challenges can be
grouped into two general categories: 1) social and moral concerns, in-
cluding concerns regarding unintended consequences, and 2) internation-
al and domestic law governance issues.
1. "Moral Hazard" and "Unintended Consequences" Concerns
The "moral hazard" concern associated with climate geoengineer-
ing tactics, including OIF, is that these techniques represent a short cut or
substitute for continuing with aggressive targets and timetables for
greenhouse gas emission reductions for all nations.47 Advocates of cli-
mate geoengineering techniques disagree with this characterization and
maintain that these techniques would supplement, not supplant, existing
climate change mitigation mandates. 48 Regardless of whether the moral
hazard concern is well grounded, climate geoengineering tactics remain
highly controversial because of this issue.
In addition to the moral hazard obstacle, concerns abound regarding
the unintended consequences of climate geoengineering techniques. The
international community has previously confronted unintended conse-
quences concerns regarding such deliberate alteration of the "natural or-
der of things" in other contexts. One example is the release of genetically
modified organisms under the Biosafety Protocol to the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD). 49 The Earth's climate system is so complex,
and our understanding of it so incomplete, that OIF could cause danger-
ous unintended consequences that ultimately risk doing more harm than
the alternative of inaction. Critics of OIF are concerned that a chain reac-
tion of geoengineering responses to the intended and unintended conse-
TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 5 (2010) [hereinafter GAO
Report] (statement of Frank Rusco, Director, Natural Resources and Environment), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10546t.pdf.
46. Id. at 10.
47. See Laura Helmuth, Riled up About Geoengineering, SMLTHSONIAN.COM, Feb. 23, 2010,
http://blogs.smithsonianmag.con/science/2010/02/23/riled-up-about-geoengineering/.
48. See Josh Horton, What Moral Hazard?, GEOENGINEERING POLITICS, Sept. 17, 2010,
http://geoengineeringpolitics.blogspot.com/2010/09/what-moral-hazard.html.
49. See Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted
Jan. 29, 2000, 39 EL.M. 1027, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208.
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quences of the deliberate alteration of the climate system could continue
indefinitely. 50 One critic cautioned that, "[e]nvironmental impacts asso-
ciated with ocean fertilization schemes could dwarf the current Gulf oil
spill disaster. 51
Two important issues demonstrate the potential for more harm than
good from OIF projects. First, OIF has been proposed as a potential
strategy to mitigate ocean acidification. Ocean acidification is caused
by increased carbon deposition in the oceans as a result of increased at-
mospheric carbon dioxide.53 A 2010 study concluded, however, that OIF
"can only slightly mitigate surface ocean acidification caused by anthro-
pogenic [carbon dioxide] emissions, and at the expense of accelerated
acidification of the deep ocean., 54 Second, in 2008, a moratorium on OIF
was implemented under the CBD because of the need for more research
on the unsettled science of OIF and because of the potential for unin-
tended consequences that could ensue from deploying OIF techniques.5
Two years later, the value of this precautionary measure became evident
when a study revealed that OIF could produce toxic algae blooms and
cause neurological disorders in marine mammals.56
Research on OIF within the past two years has concluded that
57OIF's carbon sequestration potential comes at a high ecological price.
OIF has the potential to negatively impact the oceans by disturbing and
destroying marine ecological systems. One recognized side effect of OIF
is that it can significantly increase the chances of neurotoxin produc-
tion.58 The neurotoxins, in turn, can ascend the food chain and contami-
50. Adam Corner & Nick Pidgeon, Geoengineering the Climate: The Social and Ethical Impli-
cations, ENv'T., Jan.-Feb. 2010, at 24, 31.
51. Iron Fertilization Dead in the Water? Controversial Geoengineering Proposal Banned in
US Climate Legislation, UNDERWATER TIMES.COM NEWS SERVICE, (2010), http://www.
underwatertimes.com/news.php?article id=20716358491.
52. Long Cao & Ken Caldeira, Can Ocean Iron Fertilization Mitigate Ocean Acidification?, A
Letter, 99 CLIMATIC CHANGE, 303, 303 (2010), available at http://www.stanford.edu/~longcao/
Cao&Caldeira(2010).pdf.
53. See Robin Kundis Craig, Climate Change Comes to the Clean Water Act: Now What?, 1
WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV'T 5, 9 (2010).
54. Cao & Caldeira, supra note 52.
55. Abate & Greenlee, supra note 41, at 576.
56. Charles Trick, et al., Iron Enrichment Stimulates Toxic Diatom Production in High-Nitrate,
Low ChlorophyllAreas, 107 PNAS 5587, 5891 (2010).
57. Jessica Marshall, Ocean Geoengineering Scheme May Prove Lethal: Seeding the oceans
with iron could result in the production of a potent neurotoxin, putting the lives of birds, fish and
even humans at risk, DISCOVERY NEWS, Mar. 15, 2010, http://news.discovery.com/earth/
geoengineering-carbon-sequestration-phytoplankton.html.
58. Ocean Geo-Engineering Produces Toxic Blooms of Plankton, PHYSORG.COM, Mar. 15,
2010, http://www.physorg.com/print187896509.html [hereinafter PHYSORG.COM].
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nate food webs on which marine life feed,59 which can lead to illness and
mortality of thousands of marine mammals and birds along the coast of
North America. Human mortality also may ensue from consuming sea-
food that contains the toxin. In addition, OIF also is likely to cause a lack
of oxygen in non-surface waters resulting from the burgeoning growth of
phytoplankton. The increased phytoplankton growth also prevents sun-
light from reaching deep waters, which causes increased mortality rates
of different organisms that may serve as a foundation for many ecosys-
tems. 61 In large-scale OIF projects, the changes in ecosystems can poten-
tially cause local extinctions of certain species. 62 At the same time, OIF
may also facilitate the introduction of invasive species because artificial-
ly introduced iron may contain unidentified microscopic organisms that
can disrupt the marine ecosystems.
63
While the moral hazard and unintended consequences concerns
have merit, the precautionary principle counterbalances these fears. The
precautionary principle counsels that "where there are threats of serious
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used
as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environ-
mental degradation. ' 64 Domestic and international protections against
species extinction operate on this basis, as did the aggressive regulation
of the stratospheric ozone depletion under the Montreal Protocol re-
gime. 65 Similarly, scientists have posited a tipping point for climate
change at which intervention strategies will be futile.66 OIF and other
geoengineering strategies arguably need to be researched and potentially
deployed well in advance of reaching such a tipping point. The converse
59. Marshall, supra note 57. However, at least one expert questions the degree of harm posed
by this alleged concern. "Harmful algal blooms (HABs) are blooms of algae that produce toxic sub-
stances that can affect other organisms. They are predominantly a coastal phenomenon and there is
no evidence of such blooms arising from iron fertilization experiments. The algae associated with
most coastal HABs are rare in the open ocean and are not associated with natural or iron fertilized
blooms there." Dr. Margaret Leinen, et. al., Why Ocean Iron Fertilization?, CLIMOS, Mar. 12, 2009,
http://www.climos.com/pubs/2009/Climos Why OIF-2009-03-12.pdf.
60. PHYSORG.CoM 2010, supra note 58.
61. Jennie Dean, Iron Fertilization: A Scientific Review with International Policy Recommen-
dations, 32 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 321, 330 (2009).
62. Id. at 330-331.
63. Id. at 331. But see Leinin et al., supra note 59 (noting that many of the feared effects of
OF are limited to coastal waters and OF experiments would be conducted in open ocean waters
beyond national jurisdiction).
64. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 15, adopted June 14, 1992, 31
EL.M. 874.
65. See The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,
1522 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered intoforce Jan. 1, 1989).
66. See Juliet Eilperin, Debate on Climate Shifts to Issue of Irreparable Change;
Some Experts on Global Warming Foresee 'Tipping Point' When It Is Too Late to Act, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 29, 2006, at AO1.
Seattle Journal of Environmental Law
may be equally compelling, however. The precautionary principle could
be used to support the conclusion that the potentially severe unintended
consequences of OIF would weigh against immediate implementation of
large-scale OIF.
The international community has confronted and overcome moral
hazard and unsettled science concerns in other contexts, such as the regu-
lation of genetic engineering under the Biosafety Protocol and the devel-
opment and oversight of nuclear energy. If society is to advance and con-
front modern problems, the international community needs to remain
flexible and innovative about how best to respond. No solution to climate
change will please everyone or be without risk. Some commentators
have suggested that the dangers posed by OIF simply require a careful
and structured approach to continued research.67
2. Governance Issues for OIF at the Domestic and International Levels
Unlike REDD, which is already incorporated into the governance
structure for climate change in the Copenhagen Accord,68 the methods
and framework for OIF governance are highly uncertain at this time. In-
ternational governance of OIF is necessary for one or both of the follow-
ing interrelated reasons: 1) OIF projects likely will occur outside any
single country's 200-mile exclusive economic zone,69 and 2) transboun-
dary impacts are likely to be involved .7
OIF is potentially subject to a wide range of international environ-
mental treaty mandates contained in the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the London Convention and Protocol,
the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Antarctic Treaty regime.
First, under UNCLOS, OIF may qualify as "pollution.7 1 Second, under
the London Convention and Protocol, OIF could be considered "dump-
ing.",7 2 Third, proposed OIF activities have targeted the Southern Ocean
as a likely area for large-scale experiments. The Southern Ocean is strict-
ly regulated by the Antarctic Treaty, the Madrid Protocol on Environ-
67. For example, one commentator has called for the creation of a new U.S. agency to lead
research initiatives on climate geoengineering techniques. See William Daniel Davis, What Does
Going Green Mean?: Anthropogenic Climate Change, Geoengineering, and International Environ-
mental Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 901, 938-950 (2009).
68. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 2, arts. 6, 8.
69. Abate & Greenlee, supra note 41, at 572.
70. GAO Report, supra note 45, at 6.
71. Abate & Greenlee, supra note 41, at 573.
72. Id. at 578.
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mental Protection, and the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic
Marine Living Resources.73
The CBD and the London Convention and Protocol treaty regimes
have responded directly to the prospect of OIF regulation; 74 however,
neither has implemented any binding treaty mandates on the issue. The
International Maritime Organization (IMO), the implementing body for
the London Treaty Convention and Protocol, held a meeting on March 5,
2010, that addressed the progress made on OIF science. 7 The IMO man-
dated the assembly of a Correspondence Group to review the final text of
the CBD report, "Scientific Synthesis on the Impacts of Ocean Fertiliza-
tion on Marine Biodiversity," released in January 2010, to assess its ade-
quacy and to provide recommendations. 76 Members of the Correspon-
dence Group failed to reach consensus on whether this report adequately
summarized the current state of scientific knowledge on OIF.77
The Correspondence Group identified two gaps in the report. First,
the report only focused on the potential impacts OIF may cause to marine
diversity, rather than providing a comprehensive summary of the current
state of knowledge on OIF.78 Second, the Correspondence Group identi-
fied that the report lacked sufficient guidance for determining what level
of impact to marine diversity is acceptable. 79 The Correspondence Group
recommended that this second gap could be addressed by identifying
upper and lower levels of potential impacts in individual sea areas that
have been targeted for potential deployment of OIF projects, such as the
Southern Ocean.' ° As of this writing, the Correspondence Group is work-
ing on a document that will provide a comprehensive report on the cur-
rent state of knowledge on OIF, which is scheduled for release in April
2011.81
73. Hugh Powell, Dumping Iron and Trading Carbon, 46 OCEANUS MAG. 22, 23 (2008),
available at http://www.whoi.edu/cms/files/Oceanuskron TradingCarbon 30866.pdf.
74. See Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Scientific Synthesis of the Impacts of
Ocean Fertilization on Marine Diversity. CBD Technical Series No. 45 (1981), available at
http://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-ts-45-en.pdf (2009); Int'l Maritime Org. (IMO), Scientific
Group of the London Convention, Ocean Fertilization: Development of Science Overviews on
Ocean Fertilization, IMO Doc. LC/SG 33/2/1 (Mar. 5, 2010), available at http://www.imo.org/
includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data id%3D27823/2-1 .pdf.
75. IMO, supra note 74, at 1.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2-3.
81. IMO, Scientific Group of the London Convention, Ocean Fertilization: Development of
Science Overviews on Ocean Fertilization, 2, IMO Doc. LC/SG/ES.2/1 (July. 30, 2010), available at
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data id%3D29393/2-1 .pdf.
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To capitalize on the treaty regimes' growing awareness of the need
to regulate OIF, these overlapping and potentially conflicting treaty
mandates need to be reconciled. Precedent for harmonizing treaty objec-
tives exists in international environmental law. For example, in the cli-
mate change context, the Kyoto and Montreal Protocol regimes are
working together to address the regulation of hydrofluorocarbons
(HFCs), an ozone-depleting substance and a potent greenhouse gas. 
2
Similarly, in the OIF context, an inter-treaty body could be established to
harmonize UNCLOS, CBD, and the London Convention and Protocol.83
The IMO could serve as the implementing body for such inter-treaty
coordination.
8 4
In the alternative, a new governance structure could be established
in a separate treaty to evaluate new technologies. The Swedish Society
for Nature Conservation developed such a proposal, the International
Convention for the Evaluation of New Technologies, under which OIF
and other new and emerging technologies could be assessed, monitored,
and regulated.8 5 The proposal calls for the establishment of scientific
committees that would identify and evaluate new technologies and sup-
port the diffusion of such new technologies once they are determined to
be safe.8 6 A narrower version of this proposal could involve a new treaty
focused exclusively on assessing, monitoring, and regulating climate
geoengineering strategies.
However, simply conducting OIF research is controversial.87 One
proposal emphasizes the establishment of a governance system for
geoengineering research, in addition to a subsequent and separate gover-
nance system to oversee the deployment of such geoengineering tech-
niques.88 Alternatively, geoengineering research could proceed under the
direction of international research consortia. This approach was em-
ployed in the context of the Human Genome Project and the European
82. ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY, A CLIMATE BRIEFING: THE MONTREAL
PROTOCOL MUST WORK IN COLLABORATION WITH THE CLIMATE TALKS TO REGULATE HFCs TO
PREVENT EXACERBATION OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE WHILE RESTORING THE OZONE LAYER 2
(2008), available at http://www.eia-global.org/PDF/report Climate-Jan09.pdf.
83. Abate & Greenlee, supra note 41, at 589-91.
84. Id. at 590.
85. DIANA BRONSON ET AL., SWEDISH SOCIETY FOR NATURE CONSERVATION, RETOOLING THE
PLANET? CLIMATE CHAOS IN THE GEOENGINEERING AGE 40-41 (2009), available at
http://www.etcgroup.org/upload/publication/pdf file/Retooling%20the%20PIanet.finaI .pdf.
86. Id. at 41.
87. See IFM-GEOMAR, Ocean Iron Fertilization: A Curse or a Blessing?, RESEARCH IN
GERMANY, Dec. 23, 2009, http://www.research-in-germany.de/37230/2009-12-15-ocean-iron-
fertilization-a-curse-or-a-blessing,sourcePageld= 12370.html.
88. GAO Report, supra note 45, at 14.
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Organization for Nuclear Research. 89 Proceeding in this manner offers
the benefits of precaution in applying emerging technologies while not
complicating and constraining the need for expeditious research through
a new or revised treaty regime. 90
In addition to the international governance challenges, any compre-
hensive federal climate change response in the United States also must
address geoengineering regulation. Existing federal laws such as the Ma-
rine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA) 91 and the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 92 may apply to OIF projects.
These statutes have limited applicability, however, based on the party
that is conducting the activity 93 and the location where such activities
take place.94
Within the past two years, however, Congress has undertaken a
formal evaluation, and response to the use, of OIF. Beginning in 2009,
the Science and Technology Committee of the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives conducted hearings to consider the benefits and risks of a va-
riety of climate geoengineering techniques, including OIF.95 In May
2010, Senators John Kerry and Joseph Lieberman introduced the Ameri-
can Power Act,96 the latest congressional initiative to address climate
change, which included a proposed ban on the use of OIF.
9 7
B. Generating and Accounting for Carbon Credits in OIF Projects
Another important dimension of OIF governance is whether, and in
what manner, to incorporate OIF into a post-Kyoto climate change treaty
as a market-based mechanism to generate credits for carbon sequestra-
tion. Tradable credits generated from the carbon dioxide sequestered
from OIF projects could be part of a climate change compliance regime
in much the same manner as avoided deforestation credits in REDD. If
OIF is regulated under this market-based approach, the opportunity to
draw on the prior successes of REDD could be optimized by allowing
two forms of creative climate change compliance mechanisms to work
89. Bracmort, supra note 44, at 38.
90. GAO Report, supra note 45, at 7.
91. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (2006).
92. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2006).
93. NEPA only applies to "major federal actions." Id. at § 4332(2)(C).
94. MPRSA only governs ocean dumping activities in U.S. territorial waters, which are defined
as waters that extend twelve miles from shore. GAO Report, supra note 45, at 11-12.
95. Bracmort, supra note 44, at 2.
96. See American Power Act (discussion draft), 111th Cong. (2010), available at
http://kerry.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/APAbill3.pdf.
97. See UNDERWATER TIMES, supra note 51; Steven J. Lutz, Iron Fertilization Out, Blue Car-
bon In, BLUE CARBON BLOG, May 27, 2010, http://bluecarbonblog.blogspot.com/2010/05/iron-
fertilization-out-blue-carbon-in.html.
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together within the same treaty regime. This arrangement would build on
the menu of flexible mechanisms to achieve compliance that are already
available under the Kyoto Protocol: emissions trading, joint implementa-
tion, and the CDM.
Although some commentators have argued that forest conservation
credits would not provide an adequate foundation for OIF credits under a
post-Kyoto scheme,98 these conclusions were premised on the application
of the CDM compliance model to OIF. 99 REDD serves as an effective
bridge between the CDM and OIF in that it is more flexible than the
CDM and enables broad-based participation through the use of avoided
deforestation and forest degradation as a means to earn carbon credits.
Unlike the CDM, REDD credits are not encumbered by requirements
such as securing host party approval or promoting a host country's sus-
tainable development.100 Like REDD, OIF-generated carbon credits have
the flexibility to be incorporated into a voluntary or mandatory post-
Kyoto climate change compliance regime without having to adhere to the
CDM requirements. However, OIF will be better positioned to enter
these carbon markets after some of the implementation hurdles asso-
ciated with REDD have been resolved.
Like REDD credits, OIF-generated carbon credits will be subject to
the same basic requirements as other projects in the existing carbon mar-
kets under the Kyoto Protocol and the EU Emissions Trading System
(EU-ETS). °1 Such projects must meet the following requirements: 1)
monitoring and verification, 2) additionality, 3) permanence, and 4)
avoiding leakage. 
102
First, OIF projects face the challenge of adequate monitoring and
verification. Monitoring of phytoplankton blooms is conducted with sa-
tellite technology. 10 3 However, according to scientists who have been
involved in past iron fertilization experiments, "adequate verification
cannot yet be achieved with currently available observing capabili-
ties." 1°4 Moreover, "satellites are unable to detect the amount of carbon
that is re-released back into the atmosphere through phytoplankton respi-
ration."' 105 Even if OIF carbon sequestration can be effectively monitored
98. See, e.g., Christine Bertram, Ocean Iron Fertilization in the Context of the Kyoto Protocol
and the Post-Kyoto Process, 38 ENERGY POL'Y 1130 (2010).
99. Id. at 1138.
100. Id.
101. See European Commission Climate Action, EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS),
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index en.htm (last visited Dec. 9, 2010) [hereinafter EU Emis-
sions Trading System].
102. See Powell, supra note 73.
103. Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, supra note 39, at 4.
104. Id. at 8.
105. Dean, supra note 61, at 328.
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and verified, the costs of doing so could be prohibitive. Such financial
barriers could make a viable market in OIF-generated carbon credits
more difficult to achieve.
Next, assuming OIF project proponents will be able to overcome
the challenges associated with monitoring and verification, these projects
will probably satisfy the three remaining requirements. Additionality re-
fers to the fact that OIF-generated carbon credits cannot derive from car-
bon reductions that would have occurred anyway in the absence of the
financed project. 10 6 This requirement is easily met in the OIF context
because carbon mitigation is the reason why OIF projects are underta-
ken.1 0 7 Carbon credits also must be permanent. That is, the carbon reduc-
tions must last for at least one hundred years in the forestry context.
However, this standard may be modified for OIF projects.0 8 Avoidance
of leakage 0 9 may pose more of a challenge for OIF project proponents in
that they would have to account for fuel used to reach the site and any
greenhouse gases generated as a result of the OIF project.1 0
Additionally, voluntary markets are available.1 However, OIF
credits are less likely to fare well in these markets, because voluntary
markets are not subject to strict regulations like the Kyoto and EU-ETS
markets.1 1 2 Consequently, OIF-generated carbon credits could face a per-
ception of illegitimacy in these markets because they are new and their
accounting is more complicated than avoided deforestation credits. 3
IV. CONCLUSION
OIF offers significant promise to follow REDD as a potential com-
ponent of carbon markets in a post-Kyoto climate change regime. How-
ever, international governance challenges to regulate OIF in a consistent
and effective manner must be addressed. Additionally, the use of OIF for
106. Dr. Margaret Leinen, Building Relationships Between Scientists and Business in Ocean
Iron Fertilization, 364 MARINE ECOLOGY PROGRESS SERIES 251, 252 (2008).
107. Christine Bertram, Ocean Iron Fertilization: An Option for Mitigating Climate Change?,
5 (Kiel Inst., Kiel Policy Brief No. 3, 2009), available at http://www.ifw-kiel.de/wirtschaftspolitik/
politikberatung/kiel-policy-brief/kiel policy brief 3.pdf.
108. Leinen, Building Relationships, supra note 106, at 252-53.
109. "Leakage is the concept that if deforestation is halted in one project area, the market de-
mands will simply shift deforestation to another unregulated area, thus nullifying the benefit of
emissions reductions in the project area." Abate & Wright, supra note 9, at 103.
110. Leinen, Building Relationships, supra note 106, at 253.
111. These voluntary markets now exist concurrently with mandatory markets, but in different
regions of the world. Ideally, there will be a mandatory global carbon market that would be devel-
oped as an indispensable component of a post-Kyoto climate change treaty, which could include
carbon credits generated from both REDD and OIF projects.
112. See EU Emissions Trading System, supra note 101.
113. See Powell, supra note 73, at 24-25.
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private gain also needs to be more fully researched and accepted in the
international community. While a contentious path is ahead, OIF offers
the international community one piece of a solution to the carbon crisis
that is worth exploring.
If the international community is governed by a mere patchwork of
regional agreements employing voluntary or mandatory carbon markets
in the post-Kyoto era, the absence of a coordinated international gover-
nance framework to manage OIF projects could be catastrophic to the
marine environment because potentially dangerous OIF experiments
could proceed without oversight. Therefore, if the international commu-
nity fails to implement a post-Kyoto treaty, a new international treaty
should be negotiated to regulate OIF and similar emerging technologies
to ensure adequate protection of the environment. At a minimum, exist-
ing treaty obligations should be harmonized to govern OIF in an effec-
tive and consistent manner.
The use of OIF for private gain to generate carbon credits is unlike-
ly to be viable in the near future, but it is a goal that will come closer to
fruition if and when a global carbon credit system is in place for REDD
activities. Even the most optimistic of outcomes for OIF will likely in-
volve a period of postponed commercialization of the field until signifi-
cant additional research can be conducted to assess the effectiveness and
risks of OIF and the verifiability of OIF-generated carbon credits. REDD
has already confronted some of these challenges and is making progress
in overcoming them.
If the implementation obstacles to OIF can be overcome, the inter-
national community stands to gain a great deal from the carbon credits
that can be generated from OIF, much like those generated from REDD.
Such credits promote environmental protection benefits by sequestering
carbon from the atmosphere. These credits also offer the flexibility to
address global climate change regulation in a way that is more flexible
and potentially effective to promote broad-based participation from both
developed and developing nations in a post-Kyoto climate change re-
gime.
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